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This article analyzes Rousseau's political theory of private property, fills a lacuna in the 
literature, and develops a novel interpretation of Rousseau's apparently contradictory 
remarks. Although Rousseau was critical of private property, he did not advocate a clear and 
easy solution to the problems he discerned. Instead, he put forth a highly differentiated 
perspective that was principled and pragmatic. He rooted the legitimacy of private ownership 
in an ideal theory of republican property rights, which refers primarily to the normative 
principle of reciprocity. In his opinion, a balance of private property rights is indispensable 
to a well-ordered society and a just republic not only because it binds the state, society, and 
citizen together, and not only because it secures the independence of individual citizens from 
each other, but also because it enhances political legitimacy and reciprocity. On these 
principled grounds, Rousseau’s theory rules out “collectivist” solutions as much as vast 
differences in wealth and “absolutist” theories of more or less unlimited private property 
rights. Instead, his theory builds on the republican idea of private property as a public 
political institution. Within this ideal framework, Rousseau allows for certain non-ideal 
deviations in particular circumstances on prudential grounds. 
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"I must read Rousseau until the beauty of the language no longer moves me, and then I look 





While many of Rousseau's ideas are well understood on what would be his tri-centennial, his 
thoughts on political economy--particularly his analysis of private property--are still seen by 
many scholars as puzzling at best, and incoherent at worst. In his most famous work on this 
subject, the Second Discourse, Rousseau presents himself as a radical critic of private 
property who supported far-reaching reforms. Yet in other writings, particularly in his 
Discourse on Political Economy and in the Social Contract, he champions private property 
not only as a core social institution, but even as the foundational principle of any legitimate 
political community.
 
Critics have often taken this duality in his analysis of private property – 
with "contradictions enough to warm the enthusiasm of any Hegelian"
2
 – as evidence of 
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Immanuel Kant, Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime, 1764, quoted 
in Ernst Cassirer, Rousseau, Kant and Goethe (Princeton: Kristeller and Randal, 1945), 6-7. 
                 2 James McAdam, “Rousseau: The Moral Dimensions of Property,” in Theories of Property: 
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incoherence.  One critic even accused Rousseau of writing opportunistically on the topic of 
private property.
3
 However, the frequency and intensity of Rousseau's references to property, 
and its centrality to his thoughts about liberty and justice, indicate the depth of his concern 
and suggest the need for a more systematic explanation beyond opportunism.  
This article inquires whether it is possible to defend Rousseau’s own claim that any of 
the “contradictions [in his writings] reflect the contradictions in things.”4 On the one hand, 
Rousseau argues ardently that private property has been unjustly instituted; yet, on the other 
hand, he claims that the institution of property is the foundation of justice. How can property 
be both the foundation of justice and injustice? Are there different theories of property in 
Rousseau?
5
 Or does Rousseau, although he lacks “a succinct…theory of property,”6 
                                                                                                                                                        
A Short History of Distributive Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004), 58-61; 
Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (London: Penguin Books, 1965); Carol Blum, Rousseau and 
the Republic of Virtue: The Language of Politics in the French Revolution (Ithaca, NY : 
Cornell University Press, 1986); Lucio Colletti, From Rousseau to Lenin (London: Monthly 
Review, 1972) ; Lester Crocker, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, v. I-II (New York: Macmillan, 
1968); Jacob Leib Talmon, The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy (London: Secker & 
Warburg, 1952). 
             3 Alexandre Chabert, “Rousseau économiste,” In Revue d’histoire economique et sociale 42 
(1964): 345-56.  
                4 Allan Bloom, “Jean-Jacques Rousseau,” in History of Political Philosophy, ed. Leo Strauss 
and Joseph Cropsey (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 559-80. On Rousseau’s 
awareness of these apparent paradoxes, see Jean-Jacques Rousseau, “Letter to D’Alembert on 
the Theatre,” in Politics and the Arts, trans. Allan Bloom (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 1973), 131. 
5 
Robert Wokler claims that Political Economy represents a different view on property than 
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nonetheless offer a coherent framework, albeit one that embodies complicated tensions?  
Some scholars have suggested that the tensions in Rousseau’s theory may be 
reconciled by more cautiously differentiating his references to the “sovereign” and the 
“magistrate” with regard to the relation between the state’s and the individual’s property 
rights.
7
 Other scholars have looked at Rousseau’s emphasis on the civic nature of property 
rights and at their inherent limitations as enduring themes in his writings on property.
8
 Recent 
contributors to this discussion have focused on “amour propre” in the Second Discourse as a 
key to his thinking about political economy
9
 and his theory of property in particular.
10
 Others 
                                                                                                                                                        
the other treatments by Rousseau, and believes this text to be influenced by Locke, but 
Wokler does not seek to reconcile or understand the sources of the contrasting views. See 
Robert Wokler, Social Thought of J.J. Rousseau (New York: Garland, 1987), 77, n89. Other 
studies have attempted to resolve apparent contradictions in Rousseau by noting his political 
prudence, but have not focused sufficiently on the issue of private property. See Ruth 
Weissbourd Grant, Hypocrisy and Integrity: Machiavelli, Rousseau, and the Ethics of Politics 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), 102-110. 
6 McAdam, “Rousseau: The Moral Dimensions of Property,” 181. 
7 
For references to this argument, see Ryan P. Hanley, “Political Economy and Individual 
Liberty,” in The Challenge of Rousseau, ed. Eve Grace and Christopher Kelly (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013), 37; and especially in Robert Derathè, “Introduction: 
Discours sur l’économie Politique,” in Oeuvres Completes, Volume III, ed. Bernard Gagnebin 
and Marcel Raymond (Paris: Gallimard, 1964), 72-81. 
               8 
Christo Bertram, Rousseau and the Social Contract (London/New York: Routledge, 2004), 
90. 
               9
 Frederick Neuhouser, Rousseau’s Theodicy of Self-Love: Evil, Rationality, and the Drive for 
Recognition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) 
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have emphasized Rousseau’s Discourse on Political Economy and have argued that his theory 
of property expresses “prioritarian libertarianism,” which underscores the crucial right of self-
preservation and hence the natural foundation of ownership.
11
 
In this article, we offer an interpretation of Rousseau’s theory of property that takes 
into account equally the Second Discourse and Political Economy, that integrates the Social 
Contract into the picture, and that systematically connects the allegedly contradictory 
arguments found in these writings. We contend that Rousseau’s position on property involved 
three principal arguments.
12
 First, he was concerned with the social status of property, which 
renders its significance and consequences highly contextual. In his opinion, the normative 
implications of property substantially vary according to the social, cultural, and political 
conditions in which it is situated. This is a key reason why Rousseau’s perspective on private 
                                                                                                                                                        
              10
 Chris Pierson, “Rousseau and the Paradoxes of Property,” European Journal of Political 
Theory 12 (2013): 409-424. 
11
 Hanley, “Political Economy and Individual Liberty,” 34-56. 
                12
 In addition to the above cited works, this article also builds on work by earlier scholars who 
sought to reconcile Rousseau’s writings on private property, including Nannerl Keohane,  
“Rousseau on Life, Liberty and Property: A Comment on McAdam,” in Parel and Flanagan, 
Theories of Property, 203-220; Richard Teichgraeber, “Rousseau’s Argument for Property,” 
History of European Ideas 2 (1981): 115-34; Ethan Putterman, "The Role of Public Opinion in 
Rousseau's Conception of Property," History of Political Thought 20 (1999): 417-37; Ethan 
Putterman, "Realism and Reform in Rousseau's Constitutional Projects for Poland and 
Corsica," Political Studies 49 (2001): 395-418; and Bloom “Jean-Jacques Rousseau." 
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property is critical and affirmative without being incoherent or opportunistic.
13
  
Second, his positive conception of property implicitly weaves together two distinct 
strands of reasoning. Rousseau advances what John Rawls calls a “realistic utopian” political 
theory of private property, which combines “ideal” and “non-ideal” theory. On the one hand, 
Rousseau reflects on the “ideal” constitution of property under ideal or most favorable 
conditions – that is, within the context of his theory of a fully legitimate republican 
government. On the other hand, he also considers property when its real-world settings 
deviate from those that define just republics. In those reflections, thoughts about prudence 
also guide Rousseau’s analysis. Consequently, the tensions that exist within his normative 
political theory of private property should not be interpreted as evidence of incoherence but 
rather as a reflection of the real trade-offs between principle and prudence.  
Finally, with regard to Rousseau’s ideal theory of private property, we emphasize a 
normative argument that has hitherto been often neglected in the literature.
14
 We maintain that 
while Rousseau takes into account the natural rights of first occupants, he insists that it is the 
political principle of reciprocity which eventually renders individual property claims 
legitimate. This argument is most clearly articulated in the Social Contract, but is evident 
                                                 
               13
 On Rousseau’s contextualism in this respect, see also Teichgraeber “Rousseau’s Argument”; 
Timothy O'Hagan, Rousseau (London: New York: Routledge, 1999); Fridén, Rousseau’s 
Economic Philosophy. 
14 
Putterman, in “The Role of Public Opinion,” hints at some aspects of this argument when he 
stresses Rousseau’s idea of “legal title” and of “mutually agreed upon convention(s)” as 
rendering the peculiar form of legitimacy of private property (435). Putterman focuses above 
all on the question of the relation between property and public opinion. See also Klaus D. 
Schulz, Rousseaus Eigentumskonzeption. Eine Studie zur Entwicklung der bürgerlichen 
Staatstheorie (Frankfurt  a. M./New York: Campus, 1980). 
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throughout his oeuvre. Hence, while many interpreters consider the Social Contract as “the 
most difficult text to incorporate into a single, coherent Rousseauian view” on property,15 it is 
precisely here that the key principle of his ideal theory of private property lies. The principle 
of reciprocity both implies that the legal protection of private property rights is crucial for the 
individual freedom of citizens and, at the same time, that there are limits equally important for 
citizens’ freedom. Since this principle and its concrete implications can only be realized by 
the institution of private ownership within the context of a just republic, Rousseau holds that 
private property is an indispensable dimension of a legitimate and just political regime. 
Understood in this manner, Rousseau’s political economy offers a coherent theory of the 
legitimacy and political function of private property as a republican institution.  
Our analysis proceeds in four stages. The first connects Rousseau’s republican 
understanding of property with the concepts of “ideal” and “non-ideal” theory, and “realistic 
utopia” (originally coined by John Rawls). The second section investigates Rousseau's 
understanding of the social status of private property in his critique of inequality in the Second 
Discourse. Although Rousseau appears almost exclusively critical here, he also reveals the 
foundations for his positive republican theory of private property. The third section examines 
Rousseau’s “ideal” or principled defense of private property as a necessary component of 
republican citizenship in the Discourse on Political Economy and the Social Contract. The 
fourth section discusses Rousseau’s attempts to reconcile his principled and his prudential 
                                                 
15
 Pierson, “Rousseau and the Paradoxes of Property,” 416.  Frederick Neuhouser, 
“Rousseau’s Critique of Economic Inequality,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 41 (2013): 193-
225, stresses the significance of the political principles set out in the Social Contract for 
Rousseau’s reflections on the problem of economic inequality. For Neuhouser, these political 
principles can be derived from the two “fundamental interests” of citizens in well-being and 
in freedom.  
 9 
reflections and the trade-offs that particular circumstances may imply for private property.  
 
Private Property and “Realistic Utopia” 
Rousseau tackles the question of private property, its potentially problematic implications, 
and its peculiar legitimacy at two distinct theoretical levels. Each has substantially different 
implications. To clarify these two levels and the connection between them, we first offer a 
reading of Rousseau’s republican theory of private property as a “realistic utopia.”  In doing 
so, we build on the work of John Rawls, who coined the term “realistic utopia” with direct 
reference to Rousseau’s political philosophy.16 For Rawls, the term alludes to the way in 
which Rousseau combines the natural conditions of human existence with man’s social 
existence. According to Rawls, this combination may serve as a model for the normative 
function of political philosophy in general: “Political philosophy is realistically utopian when 
it extends what are ordinarily thought to be the limits of practicable political possibility and, 
in doing so, reconciles us to our political and social condition.”17 Rawls sees this specific 
combination of attention to natural conditions and social possibilities in Rousseau’s Social 
Contract. In Rawls’s opinion, a realistic utopian political theory 
must rely on the actual laws of nature and achieve the kind of stability those 
laws allow, that is, stability for the right reasons. It takes people as they are (by 
the laws of nature), and constitutional and civil laws as they might be, that is, 
as they would be in a reasonably just and well-ordered democratic 
society….Following Rousseau’s opening thought in The Social Contract, I 
shall assume that his phrase “men as they are” refers to persons’ moral and 
psychological natures and how that nature works within a framework of 
political and social institutions; and that his phrase “laws as they might be” 
                                                 
16




 Ibid., 11. 
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refers to laws as they should, or ought, to be.
18
 
Rawls’s attention to how Rousseau combines natural conditions with social possibilities 
suggests a method for coming to terms with the complicated tensions within Rousseau’s 
political economy.
19
 As we will see, Rousseau’s principled argument for private property is 
indeed located between the two poles of what Rawls would call a realistic utopia. Insofar as 
Rousseau refers to the basic psychological and moral aspects of property, his arguments are 
founded on the natural conditions of human existence. Insofar as property is embedded in the 
context of a well-ordered republic, the theory reflects the possibilities of laws and social 
institutions as they “should, or ought, to be.”  
The tension between the natural and the social conditions of political institutions 
implies, for Rousseau as much as for Rawls, a division in political theory into an ideal and a 
non-ideal component. As Rawls puts it: “The first or ideal part assumes strict compliance and 
works out the principles that characterize a well-ordered society under favorable 
circumstances. … [It] presents a conception of a just society that we are to achieve if we can. 
Existing institutions are to be judged in the light of this conception.”20 Non-ideal theory, by 
contrast, “asks how this long-term goal might be achieved, or worked toward, usually in 
gradual steps. It looks for courses of action that are morally permissible and politically 
                                                 
18
 Ibid., 13, 7. 
19
 The distinction between ideal and non-ideal theory plays a crucial role in Rawls’s overall 
conception of political liberalism and political philosophy, as well. For more on the 
distinction in Rawls’s thought, see A. John Simmons, “Ideal and Nonideal Theory,” 
Philosophy & Public Affairs 38 (2010): 5-36; Laura Valentini, “On the Apparent Paradox of 
Ideal Theory,” The Journal of Political Philosophy 17 (2009): 332-55;  Zofia Stemplowska, 
“What’s Ideal About Ideal Theory?” Social Theory and Practice 34 (2008): 319-340. 
20
 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), 245 ff. 
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possible as well as likely to be effective.”21 Although Rawls explains this distinction through 
a reference to Rousseau, he does not dwell on Rousseau’s approach and how it affects either 
his broader political philosophy or specifically his theory of property. Nor have there been 
systematic attempts to apply Rawls’s distinction to understand Rousseau’s work. We argue 
that such an endeavor is particularly illuminating with regard to Rousseau’s republican theory 
of private property.  
The notion of a “realistic utopia” is useful because Rousseau both criticizes and 
affirms certain institutionalizations of private property. Rousseau criticizes the bourgeois 
society of proprietors emerging in his time, yet he makes two distinct types of arguments in 
favor of republican private property. One is principled (or “ideal”), and the other prudential 
(or “non-ideal”).  
His principled arguments regard the question of what property might be under the 
most favorable social conditions – if set within the ideal context of a well governed republic – 
and given the natural conditions of human psychology and morality. His prudential 
arguments, by contrast, try to determine the peculiar shape and function of property under 
non-ideal conditions, in specific societies, such as Poland, Corsica, or ancient Rome. 
Although these conditions fall short of the social and cultural conditions of an ideal republic, 
they nonetheless provide the basis for legitimate or “morally permissible and politically 
possible” second-best solutions. The particular institutional shape of property rights must be 
accommodated to these conditions.
 22
 Rousseau’s principled arguments are oriented towards 
                                                 
21
 Rawls, The Law of Peoples, 89. 
              22 
See also Arthur M. Melzer’s characterization of Rousseau’s general philosophical 
perspective as a “complex idealistic realism” which “structures his thinking on the deepest 
level” and allows him to “somehow combine the two opposite tendencies” of idealistic and 
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the “natural” conditions of human psychology and morality as well as towards the ideal 
political context of a well-ordered society. His prudential arguments are normatively guided 
by the principles of this ideal theory of republican property, but they flexibly apply the 
principles to non-ideal social contexts. Taken together, these two levels of reflection form the 
basis of a realistic utopia of private property as a republican institution.  
The principled arguments of his realistic utopia appear most forcefully in Political 
Economy, in Geneva, in Emile, and (although disputed in the literature)
23
 in the Social 
Contract. Rousseau’s fully developed theory of the just republic, put forth in the Social 
Contract, first introduces the crucial argument of his ideal theory of property. According to 
this argument, a legitimate and just political society requires a balance in private ownership, 
not simply because it is a necessary means to bind the state, society and citizen,
24
 and not only 
because it enhances individual autonomy
25
 or individuals’ well-being and their natural right of 
self-preservation,
26
 but also because it enhances political legitimacy. Before we elaborate this 
core idea of Rousseau’s ideal theory of property, however, let use recall his more critical 
view, which he famously formulated in the Second Discourse.  
 
 
The Critique of Property and Its Social Status 
 
Perhaps the most famous, and definitely one of the most impressive, of Rousseau’s statements 
on property is the dramatic opening passage from the second part of the Second Discourse, 
                                                                                                                                                        
realistic political theorizing, in Arthur M. Melzer, The Natural Goodness of Man: on the 
System of Rousseau’s Thought (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 26, 25.  
23
 See, for instance, McAdam, "Rousseau: The Moral Dimensions of Property". 
24
 Fridén, Rousseau’s Economic Philosophy, 121. 
25
 Teichgraeber, Rousseau’s Argument for Property, 121 ff; O’Hagan, Rousseau, 102 ff. 
26
 Hanley, “Political Economy and Individual Liberty,” 38. 
 13 
proclaiming that the “first man who, having fenced off a plot of land, thought of saying: ‘This 
is mine’ and found people simple enough to believe him, was the real founder of civil 
society.”27 Rousseau explains that the cultivation of the soil spawned private property, and 
that the cultivation continues only insofar as the property is protected from theft and violence. 
Rousseau also recognizes that at this point in his hypothetical history, there is no judge to 
adjudicate between competing claims. This leads to “a state of potential war between the 
haves and have nots.”  
Rousseau describes how labor and possession gave rise to property-rights claims, and 
these claims, in turn, gave rise to counterclaims rooted in need. The cunning rich man 
suggested a contract to guarantee his dubious right to the property. Thereafter, inequality is 
lawfully enforced. “How can this be legitimate?” Rousseau asks rhetorically. Who is 
responsible for the fraud? Is it a conspiracy of the rich? What implications does legally 
enforced inequality have for political and social order? (And, we shall add, how can these 
implications be possibly reconciled with those much more affirmative comments of Rousseau 
on property?)  
There is no doubt that Rousseau is highly critical of the contract in the Second 
Discourse, even though in other writings he credits the same contract with bringing men 
together in a way that nothing else could.
28
 It is important, however, to consider a number of 
specific qualifications implied in his critique. One of the argument’s most fundamental 
                                                 
                  27
 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, “Second Discourse” in Oeuvres Complètes, Volume III, 
Bibliothèque de la Pléiade (Paris : Gallimard, 1964), 164, emphasis added. 
               28
 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, “Languages,” in Oeuvres Complètes Volume V, Bibliothèque de la 
Pléiade (Paris : Gallimard, 1964); Jacques Dehaussy, “La dialectique de la souveraine liberté 
dans le Contrat social,” Etudes sur le Contrat social (Paris : Association nord-americaine des 
etudes Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 1964), 119-41. 
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assumptions is, surely, the distinction between the natural origins and the social basis of 
property. While Rousseau understands property or possession in its most primitive forms as 
natural and, similar to Locke, derives it from individual labor, Rousseau stresses that property 
rights (and especially property rights in land) are strictly relational phenomena, and thus 
founded not on “nature” but on society. He further argues that society is founded upon 
(among other things) the institution of private property.  
In the Second Discourse, Rousseau is particularly interested in the social foundation of 
property. What can be said about language, reason, morality, and justice – that for Rousseau 
they are all historical results of the unfolding of the human “perfectibilité” leading from 
“nature” to “society” – also holds true for property. Being a proprietor is a specific feature of 
the “homme civilisé” but not of the “homme de la nature.” Insofar as the “homme civilisé” is 
portrayed in the Second Discourse as a mere “bourgeois … individualist in society, who needs 
society and its protective laws, but only as means to his private ends,” private property 
appears as one of his most characteristic features.
29
 Accordingly, Rousseau’s portrait of man 
and society in the Second Discourse is decidedly critical. He explicitly claims that rivalry, 
competition and conflicting interests are the “first effects of property.” In his opinion, “Men 
are forced to caress and destroy one another at the same time…when they are born enemies 
by duty and knaves by interest.”30 These effects ineluctably lead, in Rousseau's teleology, to 
                                                 
                 29
 Bloom, “Rousseau’s Critique,” 146 ff. On the specific characteristics of “bourgeois society” 
from Rousseau’s perspective, see also Arthur M. Melzer, “Rousseau and the Problem of 
Bourgeois Society,” American Political Science Review 74 (1990): 1018-33; Ryan P. Hanley, 
“Commerce and Corruption,” 139-40; and Dennis Carl Rasmussen, The Problems and Promise 
of Commercial Society: Adam Smith’s Response to Rousseau (University Park: Pennsylvania 
State University Press, 2008), 25. 
30
 Rousseau, “Second Discourse," 164, note 9. 
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the last stages of human development, where property is under threat and men come together 
to secure it. Rousseau says that men, rather than abolish the state of inequality through 
institutional change, gather to conclude a social contract that reinforces this inequality with 
the power of law, thus “eternally fixing the law of property and inequality.”31 The result is an 
enduring inequality.  
Although readers of the Second Discourse have given the social institution of property 
a lion’s share of their attention, property is not the only source of inequality in Rousseau’s 
analysis. “Esteem for natural distinctions,” such as beauty of voice and movement, unusual 
strength and dexterity, are the primary or the more natural sources of inequality
32
 and 
manifestations of the evolving “amour proper,” as several scholars have noted.33 Only later in 
the development of human history does Rousseau attribute inequality to artificial distinctions, 
such as private property.
34
 To be sure, property plays a crucial role the Second Discourse. The 
“amour propre” of the homme civilisé assumes those objective and solid forms only in those 
artificial distinctions established by property, which provide the basis on which the ever 
growing inequalities between men are effectively perpetuated.  
But surprisingly, Rousseau expresses ambivalence towards the contract that 
establishes these artificial distinctions. Insofar as Rousseau tells the history of mankind as a 
story of decay, the specific forms of private property appear problematic and illegitimate. 
This, however, is not the whole story. Rousseau argues in the Social Contract that man in 
civil society is deprived of some advantages he received from nature. Yet, in return he gains 
other benefits: his faculties are “so stimulated and developed, his ideas so extended, his 
                                                 
31
 Rousseau, “Second Discourse," 178.  
32
 Ibid, 131. 
33
 Particularly Neuhouser, “Rousseau’s Theodicy of Self-Love." 
34
 Rousseau, “Second Discourse," 132. 
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feelings so ennobled, and his whole soul so uplifted.”35 Thus, Rousseau viewed ambivalently 
the historical outcomes, such as language, reason, morality, society, and property, from the 
unfolding of human perfectibilité.  
Even in the largely critical Second Discourse, he grants property a key role in the 
establishment of justice. “The cultivation of the lands,” he writes “necessarily followed their 
division; and from property, once recognized, the first rules of justice because, in order to 
render to each his own, each must be able to possess something.”36 This first man, according 
to Rousseau, was “the real founder of civil society”37—a formulation that turns out to imply 
an intriguing constructive argument, notwithstanding its mainly ironic tone. These “first rules 
of justice,” according to Rousseau’s telling, endowed actions with a morality and intelligence 
that were surely imperfect and partly deprived, but also completely absent beforehand. As he 
later stresses in the Social Contract:   
The transition from the state of nature to the civil state produces a most 
remarkable change in man by substituting justice for instinct in his conduct and 
endowing his actions with the morality they previously lacked. … Out of a 




                                                 
35
 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, “The Social Contract,” in Oeuvres Complètes, Volume III, 
Bibliothèque de la Pléiade (Paris : Gallimard, 1964), 364-65. Rousseau’s brief clause 
following this passage—“that if the abuses of this new condition did not often degrade him 
beneath the condition he has left”—may indicate, however, that these moral improvements 




 Rousseau, “Second Discourse," 173. 
37
 Ibid.," 164, emphasis added. 
38
 Rousseau, “The Social Contract,” 364-65, emphasis added. 
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Thus, besides being a critique, Rousseau’s Second Discourse also implies a normative 
theory of property as a social institution. Consistent with this more differentiated view, 
Rousseau places the responsibility for the illegitimate manner in which property came to be 
protected on “society” -- neither on “human nature” nor on “a divinity.”39 This is crucial, 
because one obvious consequence of seeing evil as a product of political and social 
institutions (such as private property) – instead of a divinity or human nature – is that the 
solution can involve changing those institutions.
40
 Human nature is a fickle thing to try to 
change, and the heavens do not always respond to our pleas; but institutions are man-made 
and therefore can be re-made. Rousseau’s critique therefore leads not to a complete rejection 
of private property. He calls neither for a “return” to some pre-proprietary “state of nature” 
nor for some form of post-proprietary “communism,” as some scholars have suggested, which 
is a criticism that conflates Rousseau’s description with his prescription.41 Rousseau is a 
                                                 
39
 Cassirer, The Question of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, trans. Peter Gay (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1932), 75: “Rousseau created a new subject of responsibility… not 
individual man, but society.” Critics from the Church understood this. The archbishop of 
Paris, for instance, condemned Emile because it seemed to deny the dogma of original sin. 
See Cassirer, The Question, 74; O'Hagan, Rousseau, 38; Marc F. Plattner, Rousseau's State of 
Nature: An Interpretation of the Discourse on Inequality (Dekalb: Northern Illinois 
University Press, 1979). 
40
 Fidel Castro allegedly told a French journalist that Rousseau was his “teacher” and that he 
had fought Batista with the Genevan in his pocket. See Colletti, From Rousseau to Lenin, 
144.  
41
 Bloom, “Jean-Jacques Rousseau,” 152 stresses that Rousseau’s harsh critique of property 
and inequality “does not mean Rousseau is a communist or that he believed it is possible or 
desirable to do away with private property. He is far too ‘realistic’ to follow Plato’s Republic 
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tough critic when describing the consequences of property, but he is more cautious and 
“realistic” in his attempts to change the institution than some interpreters of his writing on 
property admit.  
Several determined critics of Rousseau have missed this realistic emphasis entirely. 
Voltaire, for example, argues that Rousseau wishes for us “to walk on all fours.” Voltaire 
derives his conclusion from the Second Discourse, in which Rousseau writes:  
Must societies be totally abolished? Must meum and teum be annihilated, and 
must we return again to the forests to live among bears? This is a deduction in 
the manner of my adversaries, which I would as soon anticipate as let them 
have the shame of drawing.
42
  
Rousseau understands that some readers might deduce a radical solution from his 
description of the problems property poses. After all, he criticizes the development of private 
property in lurid language by confronting the “bourgeois” society of the homme civilisé with 
the natural equality of the homme de la nature. But what he thinks should be done with 
property is another matter. Its development is irreversible, for all practical purposes. He 
therefore uses the “state of nature” as an analytical category, and not as an objective toward 
which we should strive or state to which we should return.
43
 Instead of proposing a return to 
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nature, the Second Discourse remains almost exclusively analytical and critical, not 
prescriptive. Its two major objectives are (1) to emphasize the status of property as a general 
social phenomenon, and (2) to criticize the particular institutional form that property has 
assumed in bourgeois society. The prescriptions, which Rousseau derives from this analysis, 
are found primarily in other writings and are much more cautious and complex than certain 
critics have assumed.  
 In the Second Discourse, the solution to the problems posed by property is not found 
merely “in nature” and, hence, not in an abandonment of property and society altogether. It is 
found in a politically transformed society, which includes the institution of private property. 
His solution to the contradictions of the bourgeois homme civilisé as proprietor is not the 
unpropertied homme de la nature, homme du communism, or proprietary statism, but private 
property on the basis of (and for the sake of) citizenship. Insofar as it is a social phenomenon, 
the meaning of property for Rousseau depends largely upon its social context, even though the 
natural rights associated with property are universal and prior to government. Within the 
natural environment of the homme sauvage, property is at best a very marginal phenomenon.  
In the full sense of the term, it is nonexistent. Within the context of the contradictory, 
scattered categories of homme civilisé’s society, property is a primary source of injustice, 
conflict, suffering, and cultural decay. Within the context of a “republic,” and its respective 
“political economy”, property is the cornerstone of social justice and “the most sacred of all 
the rights of citizenship.”44  
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 Property is both indispensable and variable, and thus figures prominently both in 
Rousseau’s critique of bourgeois society and in his normative theory of republican 
government. In these substantially different contexts, the meaning of property is dissimilar 
(the Second Discourse being primarily critical, and the theory of republican government being 
largely prescriptive). In both theoretical contexts, Rousseau takes “men as they are.” But 
while the Second Discourse examines society, the laws and especially property as they 
potentially can, but should not be, Rousseau’s theory of republican property examines its 
positive potential. This is why the “same institution, which is an instrument of exploitation in 
unjust societies, can be transformed, in a legitimate society founded on the social contract, 
into the vehicle of individual autonomy.”45  
 But how does this transformation take place? And what is the normative basis of this 
explicitly affirmative part of Rousseau’s understanding of property? From where, exactly, 
does the legitimacy of this transformed variant of property right come from? Not being a 
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“natural” right in the full sense of the term, what kind of right is it? Is it founded on pragmatic 
or functional reasons, such as its beneficial effects on individual material autonomy?  
 According to a “realistic utopian” interpretation of Rousseau’s thinking, Rousseau is 
proposing that the normative problem of property requires prudential considerations, yet also 
entails a fundamental principle. This principle, however, cannot be naturalistic. Rather, it 
follows a political logic that, while taking “men as they are,” is still able to extend “what are 
ordinarily thought to be the limits of practicable political possibility.”46 Rousseau’s peculiar 
way of connecting principle to prudential considerations gives his theory of private property 
its characteristic theoretical physiognomy. In the next section, we lay out its “ideal” 
foundation.   
   
The Principled Case for Private Property 
Rousseau penned two works in 1755 that discuss private property at some length. Only one, 
however, has received sustained attention: the Second Discourse.
47
 The Discourse on Political 
Economy, which Rousseau wrote for Diderot’s Encyclopedie, has received much less 
scholarly attention, although this oversight appears to have changed in recent years.
48
 Today, 
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We argue that the Discourse on Political Economy counterbalances the critical tone of 
the Second Discourse and prepares the ground for the key arguments of Rousseau’s ideal 
theory of property, which he articulates more clearly in later writings, especially the Social 
Contract. Political Economy contains important arguments regarding the natural basis of 
property, which help to connect Rousseau’s critique of property in the Second Discourse with 
his idea about the political legitimacy of property in the Social Contract. Political Economy 
makes perhaps Rousseau’s strongest argument for private property as a “natural right” – that 
is to say, as directly reflecting “persons’ moral and psychological natures.”50 "It is certain,” he 
writes, “that the right of property is the most sacred of all the rights of citizenship and even 
more important in some respects than liberty itself."
51
 Rousseau offers two main reasons for 
this assessment.  
The first concerns property and life – a connection that is famously associated with 
Locke. Rousseau avers that the law must defend private property because "it more nearly 
affects the preservation of life."
52
 He writes: "property being more easily usurped and more 
difficult to defend than life, the law ought to pay a greater attention to what is most easily 
taken away."
53
 In other words, the government provides a public good—security and the 
enforcement of property rights—because it would be inefficient and impracticable for each 
individual to provide it alone. As a consequence, government has the right to raise taxes – that 
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is, to interfere, within certain limits, with the property rights of citizens – in order to fulfill its 
protective function.
54
 To the extent that citizens enjoy the security of their property rights as a 
public good provided by the state, the security has to be financed.
55
 
Rousseau’s second reason for valuing property involves a connection between 
property and justice. He argues that "property, being the true foundation of civil society, is the 
real guarantee of the undertakings of citizens: for if property were not answerable for personal 
actions, nothing would be easier than to evade duties and laugh at the laws."
56
 Just as citizens 
need the protection of self and property to prosper, so too does society need private property 
for justice to flourish. By integrating the psychological and moral propensities of human 
nature, private property constitutes and strengthens the bonds between state, society, and 
citizen. Government was created to reinforce these bonds nurtured by property. Rousseau, 
when suggesting that government exists because of property, rather than the reverse, seems to 
echo Locke: "The general administration,” Rousseau writes, “is established only to secure 
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individual property, which is antecedent to it".
57
  
Property’s double function in the promotion of both individual liberty and justice 
primarily reflects the fact that private property has important psychological and moral benefits 
because of its accord with “the actual laws of nature” (to apply Rawls’s phrase). This was 
already indicated in the Second Discourse, where Rousseau argues that people’s "lives, 
liberties and properties are the constitutive elements of their being."
58
 In Emile, he writes (of 
his student’s education) that  
the first idea he needs is not liberty but property, and for him to have this idea, 
he must have something that belongs to him…I increase this joy by saying to 
him – this belongs to you. And then, explaining to him the term “belong,” I 




Appropriation through labor is not only a natural right; it also corresponds to the natural 
psychological, emotional, and moral inclinations of human beings. 
 
 When Rousseau argues in 
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the Discourse on Political Economy that property was "the true foundation of civil society" 
and the “true foundation of the individual,”60 he seems to be clearly referring to these 
important psychological and moral benefits of property. They amass in individuals to generate 
a healthy community and help promote justice. In this sense, as Rousseau writes in Geneva, 
property indeed is “the center of community."61  
This does not imply that Rousseau identifies the political problem of property with its 
natural foundations, or that he grants natural forms of property the status of an inviolable 
right. These “natural” characteristics of ownership, rooted in our psychological and moral 
inclinations, form the basis for Rousseau on which a Rawlsian “realistic utopia” of “the laws 
as they can be” has to be built. Although he, like Locke, emphasizes the importance of legally 
protecting and politically promoting property rights, Rousseau views the protection and 
promotion of natural property rights in a republic as transforming rather than merely securing 
these rights. This is indicated in his reflections on the status of inheritance rights and his 
references to Pufendorf, who had recently argued that "the right of property, by its very 
abstract nature, should not extend beyond the life of the proprietor, and the moment a man is 
dead, his goods should cease to belong to him.”62 Rousseau seems to agree with this view as 
far as the natural right of property is concerned. At the same time, however, he makes an 
interesting argument in favor of the intergenerational transfer of ownership – inheritance law.  
The spirit of these laws [which regulate the power of individuals in the 
disposition of their own goods], which the government ought to follow in their 
application, is that, from father to son, and from relation to relation, the goods 
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of a family should go as little out of it and be as little alienated as possible. 
There is a sensible reason for this in favor of children, to whom the right of 
property would be quite useless, if the father left them nothing, and who 
besides, having often contributed by their labor to the acquisition of their 
father’s wealth, are associates in his right of property.63  
A wise magistrate should follow a general “spirit” regarding the laws of inheritance, a spirit 
that apparently is not founded on the natural rights of first occupants. Instead, Rousseau 
defends the legitimacy of inheritance laws with a pragmatic argument: that permanent change 
in the status of citizens always ought to be avoided because it endangers the stability of 
political order.
64
 This is a crucial aspect of Rousseau’s non-ideal reflections on property in 
general.  
But Rousseau also employs a more principled argument to explain why the natural 
property rights of first occupants and those of citizens apparently are not identical in scope. 
Rousseau maintains that becoming a citizen gradually alters one’s status as a proprietor. 
Citizens, in his view, ought to contribute materially to support the republic, because as 
“members of a society” they have agreed in principle to subordinate at least part of their 
property to further the “means” to the “end” of a republican government that protects private 
property and provides other guarantees of security.
65
 That the private property rights of 
citizens may at times (for instance, in the case of inheritance) “extend” and at other times 
“restrict” (for instance, taxation) the scope of “natural” property rights seems legitimate not 
only for prudential reasons, but also because it follows directly from the principle of 
republican citizenship. Although Rousseau only intimates at these political implications in 
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Political Economy, he clearly does not merely echo Locke’s idea of natural property rights. 
While stressing the importance of rights as natural conditions, he at the same time indicates 
that they have to be integrated in a perspective that identifies the possibilities of their social 
and political transformation.   
Only in the Social Contract, however, does Rousseau directly address the question of 
how to incorporate or “transform” the natural benefits of property into a well-ordered political 
constitution. To serve as the “center of community,” as Rousseau referred to property in 
Geneva, property has to be transformed into a political right. This transformation “restricts” 
and “extends” the natural rights of property, but most importantly the transformation also 
fundamentally changes the nature of property’s legitimacy. In a pivotal chapter (“On the Civil 
State”), Rousseau ranks civil liberty and the political right of private property as equally 
important. These are the two fundamental rights, in his view, that individuals gain when they 
become citizens in a republic.
66
 Moreover, these two rights are reciprocally constitutive. 
Private property is a prerequisite for citizenship, and citizenship in turn sets the frame for the 
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legitimacy of private property rights. They are social rights—not natural, as Locke held—so 
“the right which each individual has to his own estate is always subordinate to the right which 
the community has over all.”67 But, in Rousseau’s view, this limitation only strengthens the 
force of property rights because the legitimacy of such social rights in a republic exceeds that 
of the mere natural right of the “first occupier.” The property of citizens, far from being 
merely “a necessary means whereby to keep citizens dependent on their government,”68 is 
founded on a genuinely political form of legitimacy.  
This legitimacy is achieved through a twofold act of transformation, during which the 
right of property assumes a reciprocal form. As described in the Social Contract, the 
constitution of such a republican property-rights regime requires not only the alienation of all 
natural rights of individuals and their transfer to the sovereign. It also requires that the 
sovereign in turn give these rights back to individual citizens. Only after this second step is 
property legitimate in terms of Rousseau’s ideal theory.  
Rousseau describes the two steps in detail. In the first step, individuals give up all their 
natural rights and transfer them to the sovereign: “Each member of the community gives 
himself to it, at the moment of its foundation, just as he is, with all the resources at his 
command, including the goods he possesses.”69 However, this “total alienation”70 is not 
sufficient to constitute legitimate property. It only establishes a necessary premise.  
The peculiar fact about this alienation is that, in taking over the goods of 
individuals, the community, so far from despoiling them, only assures them 
legitimate possession, and changes usurpation into a true right and enjoyment 
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into proprietorship. Thus the possessors, being regarded as depositaries of the 
public good, and having their rights respected by all the members of the State 
and maintained against foreign aggression by all its forces, have, by a cession 
which benefits both the public and still more themselves, acquired, so to speak, 
all that they gave up.
71
 
In other words, the transfer of all individual possession to the sovereign is not an institutional 
act in its own right. It is inseparably connected with the subsequent act of “reprivatization.” 
Rousseau is eager to point out that “alienation” does not constitute property in the real sense 
of the term:  
This act does not make possession, in changing hands, change its nature, and 
become property in the hands of the Sovereign; but, as the forces of the city are 
incomparably greater than those of an individual, public possession is also, in 
fact, stronger and more irrevocable, without being any more legitimate.  
What makes mere possession “change its nature” is the second step - the transfer of property 
back to individual citizens. Property gains a fully legitimate status in the hands of individual 
citizens, as it were, and not in the hands of the state. This means that, for Rousseau, legitimate 
property is possible only in the form of private property. Only then is the relational right of 
property finally constituted and does property reach its legitimizing potential (even though it 
first goes through the hands of the sovereign). The legitimizing potential lies in the principle 
of reciprocity that property establishes:  
Every man has naturally a right to everything he needs; but the positive act 
which makes him proprietor of one thing excludes him from everything else. 
Having his share, he ought to keep to it, and can have no further right against 
the community. This is why the right of the first occupier, which in the state of 
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nature is so weak, claims the respect of every man in civil society. In this right 




Through the second step of reprivatization, property receives its distinctly reciprocal 
character: any property right of an individual citizen necessarily implies the recognition of the 
property rights of his fellow citizens. Rousseau stresses that these mediated, politically 
constituted, private property rights not only strengthen the natural rights of the “first 
occupiers.” More profoundly, the nature of their legitimacy changes. The transformation adds 
to the legitimacy of the natural rights  derived from first occupation a distinctly political 
legitimacy.
73
 Republican property is derived both from its function in fostering civil liberty 
and from the principle of reciprocity that it implies. Neither the natural rights of possession 
nor a communal property right would have this specific legitimacy based on reciprocity 
between citizens. To be legitimate in this sense, property rights for Rousseau have to be 
politically constituted, and this means: they have to be individual, private rights. 
This is the core argument of Rousseau’s ideal theory of private property, which he 
derives both from the “natural” conditions of human psychology and morality, and from the 
ideal social conditions of a well-ordered republic and its frame of “laws as they should, or 
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ought to be” (again to use Rawls’s terminology).74 Instead of simply repeating Locke, 
Rousseau’s theory of property anticipates important aspects of the later debate among 
republican theorists about reciprocity, such as Kant’s conception of property and 
Tocqueville’s analysis of the American idea of property, which he found to be peculiar to 
modern democracy.
75
 On principled grounds, then, Rousseau rules out any return to “natural” 
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forms of possession, as much as any kind of rigorous economic egalitarianism, or even 
communism. Rousseau instead stresses both the social and the private nature of property.  
Consequently, Rousseau allows for certain inequalities. Even in the Second Discourse, 
he depicts both political and natural inequality as facts of life. He writes:  
I conceive that there are two kinds of inequality among human beings; one 
which I call natural or physical because it is established by nature, and consists 
of differences in age, health, bodily strength and the qualities of mind or of the 
soul; and another, which may be called moral or political inequality because it 
depends on a kind of convention.
76
  
The conclusion that Rousseau appears to draw from this distinction is that a “balanced 
proportion” should exist between the two types of inequality because “it is contrary to the law 
of nature, however defined, that children should command old men and fools wise men”.77 
Although Rousseau’s ideal theory of property neither promotes nor enforces equality, 
it does rule out extreme forms of inequality and argues in favor of a society of proprietors in 
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which every citizen has at least a minimal share of private property.
78
 Otherwise, the principle 
of reciprocity would be violated and property would lose its unique political legitimacy. As 
Rousseau asserts in the Social Contract: “In fact, laws are always of use to those who possess 
and harmful to those who have nothing: from which it follows that the social state is 
advantageous to men only when all have something and none too much.”79 When these 
fundamental conditions are absent, then the Sovereign has the right to bring them about. The 
“natural” rights of first occupants give way to the more fundamental implications of 
property’s political legitimacy:  
If the sovereign power rests upon the right of ownership, then there is no right 
more worthy of respect; it is inviolable and sacred for the sovereign power as 
long as it remains a private individual right. Once it is viewed as common to 
all citizens, it is subject to the common will, and this will may destroy it. The 
sovereign therefore has no right to touch the property of one or many, but may 
lawfully take possession of the property of all, as was done in Sparta in the 




The sovereign power therefore has the right not only to tax citizens in order to be able to 
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 but also to enforce the reciprocity principle against “natural” 
processes of appropriation. To be sure, it may be prudent for the sovereign to refrain from 
acting on this fundamental right, even when the distribution of private property in a given 
society compromises the principle of reciprocity, but those prudential reasons do not affect 
the primary argument of Rousseau’s ideal theory of property. 
In sum, Rousseau’s ideal theory of private property grounds legitimacy on both natural 
and political considerations, and prioritizes the latter. The theory binds the natural conditions 
of human psychology and morality with the natural rights of first occupiers. Most importantly, 
it relies on distinctly socio-political principles of citizenship. The key legitimizing mechanism 
is reciprocity, as practiced in a well-ordered republic, through which the “natural right” of 
first occupants is transformed into a political right of citizens. The result is an 
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institutionalization of private property that allows for certain inequalities, but excludes its 
extreme forms.  
We now turn to Rousseau’s “non-ideal theory” – or those statement that discuss how 
his ideal principles about property are to be applied, adopted, and adapted to concrete 
circumstances, which frequently fall short of the conditions in a well-ordered republic. As we 
shall see, Rousseau, while guided by the principles laid out in his ideal theory, allows for 
compromises, particularly with regard to the principle of reciprocity.  
 
The Prudential Case for Private Property 
Rousseau, a prudent political reformer, was generally skeptical about both reaction and 
revolution as viable solutions to the political problems of his day. Reaction is unsound, in his 
opinion, because it is futile to resist the tides of change. Although he appears to condone 
revolution in some writing and settings,
82
 he generally urges gradualism with regard to 
specific private-property reforms.
83
 He writes: 
Nothing is more fatal to morality and to the Republic than the continual 
shifting of rank and fortune among the citizens: such changes are both the 
proof and the source of a thousand disorders, and overturn and confound 
everything; for those who were brought up to one thing find themselves 
destined for another; and neither those who rise nor those who fall are able to 
assume the rules of conduct, or to possess themselves of the qualifications 
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requisite for their new condition, still less to discharge the duties it entails.
84
 
In Poland and Corsica, Rousseau comes across as an exceedingly prudent reformer, 
wishing to avoid the pitfalls of both radical revolution and of reactionary inflexibility.
85
 
Uncertain about local conditions in these two contexts and attuned to the prospect of 
unintended consequences, Rousseau errs on the side of the status quo in thinking about 
property reforms and the possible redistribution of voting rights, even though it required 
continuing to deny equal political participation to all citizens. In Poland, he writes: 
With regard to property qualifications, which could determine the amount of 
land a nobleman would have to own in order to be admitted to the dietines, I 
can see that there is something to be said both for and against the proposal, and 
since my knowledge of the country is insufficient to enable me to estimate the 




Rousseau acknowledge limits to his ability to prescribe for Poland and confesses that 
there is “something to be said both for and against” property qualifications in this particular 
case. He sees different sides because he considers not just the ideal, but also the non-ideal 
implications of the problem. As a matter of principle, Rousseau endorses the goal of fostering 
the economic conditions of reciprocity, at least among the different classes of Polish 
noblemen: “Legislation must always tend to diminish those great inequalities of fortune and 
power which set too great a distance between magnates and simple noblemen, and which 
                                                 
84
 Rousseau, “Political Economy,” 264. 
85
 For a recent work that explores Rousseau’s writings on Poland and Corsica, see Putterman, 
“Realism and Reform.” 
86
 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, “Poland” in Oeuvres Complètes, Volume III, Bibliothèque de la 




always have a natural tendency to increase.”87 But, he also prudently emphasizes the 
importance of taking into account the actual consequences of certain policies, laws, and 
institutions—not in terms of their “immediate effects,” but in terms of their “distant but 
inevitable consequences.”88 Accordingly, any reform of the “economic system” of Poland 
must be oriented both towards republican principles and towards the range of possibilities set 
by the traditions and manners of the people, the climate conditions, and the size of the 
territory. These possibilities fall short of ideal conditions in several respects: Poland’s 
territory is large and its nobility tends to engage in vainglorious display. Rousseau, therefore, 
entertains non-ideal solutions. The principles of republican citizenship have to be adapted to 
the real possibilities:  
If a great state refuses to conduct itself on the principles of a small republic, it 
must not look for the same benefits, nor should it reject the cause while 
desiring the consequence. If Poland were, as I should like it to be, a 
confederation of thirty-three small states, it would combine the power of a 
great monarchy with the freedom of a small republic; but this would mean 




In Rousseau’s opinion, Poland, as it exists, cannot do without property qualifications to the 
dietines, without a rather elaborate monetary system, and without prudentially established 
forms of taxation.
90
 These arrangements and institutions, while problematic when judged by 
republican principles, help to approach the best possible solutions.   
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 In Corsica, Rousseau again looks closely at local conditions. Although frequently 
accused of using vague and flowery language, Rousseau is blunt. “It is not my intention to 
destroy private property, for that is impossible, but to give a rule...which will contain and 
direct it, and keeps it always subordinated to the public good”.91 Rousseau argues that given 
Corsica’s rather undifferentiated peasant economy, the state should play the role of proprietor. 
This, he believes, would help preserve the current overall distribution of private property.  
Some readers, such as Proudhon, recognized that Rousseau was in effect justifying the status-
quo and accused him of being reactionary.  
Indeed Citizen of Geneva, you talk well! You who have impeached so 
eloquently the inequality of conditions among men, what dignity, what 
heritage, have you for me in your republic? Perfidious declaimer, have you 




Rousseau may have been a critic par excellence of contemporary conditions and events, but as 
a reformer he was exceptionally prudent, and at times unexpectedly conservative. “Precisely 
when Rousseau’s thought appears to inspire revolutions,” wrote one scholar, “it can present 
itself as a conservative return to the founding principles.”93  
Rousseau also adopts a prudential and contextual perspective in his interpretations of 
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institutions in antiquity. For instance, when praising the comitia centuriata in Ancient Rome, 
he not only accepts but seems to endorse substantial economic differences between different 
classes of the citizenry. While stating that his intention is not to reflect on the legitimacy of 
this institutionalized inequality “in itself” – “en lui-même”94 – Rousseau nonetheless approves 
of the inequality as a non-ideal solution of concrete and distinctly “Roman” problems.95 These 
problems included waves of immigrants into the large and growing Roman republic,
96
 the 
cleavage between the city and the provinces,
97
 and, above all, the large number of citizens in 




Rousseau apparently sees no contradiction between his theoretical critique of the 
development of private property and his prudent approach to the reform of actual institutions 
of private property. He recognizes that in particular cases, such as those of Corsica, Poland, 
and Rome, it is infinitely more difficult to create institutions than to destroy them. 
Consequently, he recommends a prudent approach and judges it better to contain the 
malignant effects of less-than-ideal institutions than to eradicate the institutions entirely.
99
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Although Rousseau’s advice for Poland and Corsica was not, strictly speaking, in accord with 
Rousseau’s ideal republican theory, he is not simply contradicting himself. Rather, he is 
articulating deviations from the ideal and contemplating the pragmatic necessities of local 
situations. In terms of such concrete institutional settings, there is no best regime or scheme of 
laws for all under all circumstances.
100
 Each form of government and property rights regime is 
“the best in some cases, and the worst in others.”101 Rousseau's prudence, in other words, 
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This does not mean that Rousseau’s prudential reflections render his principled 
arguments impractical and irrelevant. “Non-ideal” compromises may be necessary given the 
cultural traditions and the social circumstances in a specific society, and they may be 
“legitimate” to the extent that they gradually enable liberty and thus approximate the 
requirements of the principle of reciprocity. Such compromises, however, are not fully 
legitimate – and this holds true particularly with respect to vast differences in property – 
insofar as they do not fully meet reciprocity’s requirements and, in fact, remain an obstacle to 
fully establishing the principle of reciprocity. Rousseau’s non-ideal theory of property should 
be read as an effort to design ways to live with these obstacles, if necessary, but not to 
recommend them as substitutes for republican citizenship and for the balance in property that 
republican citizenship requires.  
 
Conclusion 
In the context of his entire oeuvre, the alleged contradictions within Rousseau’s theory of 
property turn out to be conceptual distinctions within a complex, yet coherent, overarching 
vision. The core normative notion is the idea of reciprocity and the reciprocal character of 
property rights within the framework of a “realistic utopia” of republican citizenship. 
According to Rousseau, any individual claim of legitimate private property rights necessarily 
implies the recognition of fellow citizens’ respective property claims as equally legitimate. 
This indispensable basis of legitimacy rules out both “communism” as well as vast differences 
in private property on principled grounds. 
 Consistent with property’s social status, the political principle of reciprocity serves as 
the normative connection between Rousseau’s ideal and non-ideal theory of property. In terms 
of his ideal theory, reciprocity is his principal argument for a balanced distribution of private 
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property. Rousseau seeks a society of proprietors in which every citizen has at least a minimal 
share of private property. In terms of his prudential considerations, reciprocity serves a more 
supple but equally essential purpose. His account of property, which retains flexibility without 
abandoning principles, sets an adaptable agenda for any transitory non-ideal arrangements 
along with standards according to which such arrangements can be assessed.  
 
